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The paper explores how social protection and agri‑cultural policies interact, creating either synergies or conflicts between them. To the extent that social 
protection measures help poor rural people expand their 
assets, use them more efficiently and adopt higher return 
activities, there should be strong synergies with agricul‑
tural development. Reverse synergies can also arise, if 
agricultural policies help farmers improve their liveli‑
hoods and reduce their vulnerability. But conflicts can 
occur if policy objectives are inconsistent with each other, 
and these are also examined in this paper. We draw on 
numerous examples from the across the globe, but with 
specific emphasis from the African continent to highlight 
issues including, liquidity constraints, scale and threshold 
effects, timing, seasonality and policy complementarities. 
In conclusion we consider lessons for how the agricultural 
policies and social protection instruments can be 
designed and implemented to exploit welfare and 
growth synergies.
Introduction
After a lengthy period of relative neglect, agriculture is 
back on the policy agenda of many African governments 
and international agencies. Smallholder farming is recog‑
nised by the Commission for Africa, NEPAD and others 
as central to rural livelihoods and therefore indispensable 
to food security and poverty reduction and the achieve‑
ment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 
Africa. At the same time, however, the multiple risks and 
vulnerabilities that smallholders face are increasingly 
well understood, and new policy frameworks are 
emerging that distinguish between different types and 
sources of risk (for example, idiosyncratic and covariant 
risk affecting agricultural production, markets and health) 
and between different response options (investment in 
crop or livestock protection, irrigation, market stabilisa‑
tion and access, cash transfers, and so on). Reducing risk 
in smallholder farming requires agricultural development 
policies, and policies that create a conducive enabling 
environment for agriculture, while managing risk in 
smallholder farming requires social protection policies 
that can also contribute to reducing risk. 
The paper analyses how social protection and agri‑
cultural policies interact, creating either synergies or 
conflicts between them. We explore both current and 
potential synergies and conflicts between ëwelfare‑
promotingí and ëgrowth‑promotingí forms of social 
protection and agricultural development. To the extent 
that social protection measures help poor rural people 
expand their assets, use them more efficiently and adopt 
higher return activities, there should be strong synergies 
with agricultural development. Reverse synergies can 
also arise, if agricultural policies help farmers improve 
their livelihoods and reduce their vulnerability. But 
conflicts can occur if policy objectives are inconsistent 
with each other, and these are also examined in this 
paper.
We draw on numerous examples from the across the 
globe, but with specific emphasis from the African conti‑
nent to highlight examples of a range of issues, including, 
liquidity constraints, scale and threshold effects, timing, 
seasonality and policy complementarities. We conclude 
by drawing out lessons for how the agricultural policies 
and social protection instruments can be designed and 
implemented to exploit synergies.
Mapping interactions 
between social protection 
policy and agricultural 
policy
New thinking is needed about potential synergies 
between social protection and agricultural development 
policies. The social protection policy agenda expanded 
as a distinct policy focus at the same time and as a result 
of structural adjustment and market liberalisation poli‑
cies that restricted the scope of state intervention in the 
economy, particularly in agriculture. New social protec‑
tion policies were needed partly because of the loss of 
some aspects of social protection provided by agricul‑
tural intervention policies (such as input and output 
interventions to stabilise and subsidise prices to promote 
both national food self‑sufficiency and cheap food). 
Paradoxically, therefore, some aspects of social protec‑
tion policies had been integrated within growth policies 
in state‑led agricultural development, but these were 
then separated into distinct policy spheres during stßruc‑
tural adjustment and liberalisation. There are now moves 
to integrate them again, but under the banner of ësocial 
protectioní ñ reflecting the blurring of boundaries 
between ëprotectioní and ëpromotioní policies that is 
responsible for much conceptual confusion, as noted 
above. Is there now an opportunity to reconsider lessons 
from these different growth and social protection policy 
approaches, and to move ëBeyond Liberalisationí to 
ëDevelopmental Coordinationí (Dorward et al., 2005), in 
both agricultural growth and social protection policies? 
If so, what would this involve and how could it be 
achieved?
In the search for new thinking about agricultural devel‑
opment and social protection policy synergies, it is impor‑
tant to learn from past successes and failures, taking 
account of the different contexts faced by poor rural 
economies today. A critical issue here is the need to 
recognise the changing challenges, opportunities and 
roles of both agriculture and social protection as rural 
economies develop: lessons from past successes in coun‑
tries that have successfully transformed their agricultural 
sectors may be more relevant than simplistic attempts 
to transfer current policies whose success may be context 
dependent (and not readily transferable). Critical issues 
here include the state of market development, and 
current and potential smallholder access to and engage‑
ment with different input, service and output markets 
and market opportunities. Synergies and conflicts 
between agricultural and social protection programmes 
arise at different scales. 
Synergies can arise at the macro‑level if, for example, 
effective investments in agricultural development reduce 
budgetary requirements for social protection 
programmes and/or, by promoting growth, increase 
resources available over time for financing social protec‑
tion. Synergies can arise at the micro‑level where, for 
example, social protection policies can reduce seasonal 
cash flow bottlenecks, help poor rural people expand 
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their assets, improve food security, nutritional status 
and labour productivity, use assets more efficiently and 
adopt higher return activities than they would other‑
wise, or where agricultural policies help people improve 
their livelihoods and assets for self or mutual insurance. 
The relationship between social protection and agricul‑
tural growth is thus complex and multi‑layered. 
Take the example of school feeding schemes. School 
feeding transfers food to the poor (welfarist), encourages 
investment in human capital through education 
(building resilience), and to the extent that the transfer 
is stable and durable, provides an insurance function 
against consumption shocks (risk insurance). It also 
provides a kind of ëold age insuranceí for parents, in 
the sense that there is evidence that families that have 
at least one child who has completed primary school 
are much less prone to food insecurity. Most importantly 
for our purposes, if the necessary food commodities are 
purchased locally, school feeding schemes provide 
market outlets and production incentives to small‑
holders in the area.
There are, however, also potential conflicts at these 
levels. For example at the macro‑level, agricultural and 
social protection policies are likely to compete for limited 
financial resources and influence, especially if they are 
seen as different spheres of policy and are implemented 
by different agencies. Returning to the example of 
school feeding, local sourcing of food might be prefer‑
able in theory, but too expensive and cost‑inefficient in 
practice. At the micro‑level, some forms of social protec‑
tion may undermine incentives for investment in partic‑
ular agricultural activities (for example, food aid may 
depress food market development and production), and 
some agricultural policies may increase the vulnerability 
of particular people (for example, by increasing food 
prices). Similarly, participation in labour‑based social 
protection programmes may conflict with on‑farm 
labour demands. Different synergies and conflicts may 
co exist at both the macro and micro levels, and may 
differ between programmes, even between households 
within the same programme. 
In addition to the direct multiple impacts of social 
protection measures, transfers affect peoplesí behaviour 
in indirect ways that may be unintended and unantici‑
pated by those who designed the instrument. Thus some 
conditional transfers, where receipt depends upon 
recipient behaviour (such as attending school to benefit 
from school feeding) or upon recipient characteristics 
(such as falling within a target group for unconditional 
cash transfers), may change the behaviour of potential 
recipients to improve their eligibility. These behavioural 
changes may have positive or negative impacts on other 
aspects of peopleís livelihoods (for example school 
attendance has educational benefits but may withdraw 
labour from other activities, and school meals might 
simply substitute for meals at home, reducing their net 
impact on child nutrition). Similarly the receipt of welfare 
transfers may lead to a wide range of different impacts 
on productivity ñ in addition to insurance and resilience 
building effects they may (a) prevent the loss of produc‑
tive assets, (b) allow otherwise unproductive people to 
enter the productive economy, (c) undermine or enhance 
incentives to undertake particular productive activities 
and/or (d) through consumption or production linkages 
and multipliers affect (positively or negatively) growth 
and welfare of others (by affecting prices or other aspects 
of local or wider economic and social relations). 
Moreover, we can identify particular types of relation‑
ship between social protection instruments and growth, 
involving threshold and scale size of individual transfers 
and the proportion of the population that are in receipt 
of these effects concerned with both the transfers. The 
existence of micro‑level poverty traps means that trans‑
fers that take people across an asset threshold may have 
much greater growth effects than transfers which do 
not. We therefore cannot expect simple linear relation‑
ships between the size of transfers and their productivity 
impacts  these impacts depend upon the distance that 
different recipients are from the threshold, and will vary 
between recipients in any situation, and between situ‑
ations. Transfers that bring people into the productive 
sector may also encounter thresholds, or at least strong 
discontinuities. Growth impacts of social protection 
interventions may also be strongly context dependent 
because of the need to address multiple limiting 
constraints to growth.
Synergies and conflicts arise because of various 
design choices and implementation modalities, 
including: instrument selection, timing (eg seasonality), 
scale and threshold effects, policy sequencing, predict‑
ability, targeting (including gender), the political 
economy of policy processes, and linkages with informal 
social protection. These will be discussed in turn 
below.
Instrument complementari‑
ties and trade‑offs
Social protection interventions play a crucial role in 
protecting vulnerable livelihoods, but can also have 
beneficial effects on agricultural production. This section 
explores three emerging synergies by discussing how 
various instruments can alleviate liquidity constraints 
for smallholders, create demand for farm products, and 
create multiplier effects throughout the local economy. 
Other synergies can also be assumed that are not 
discussed in detail here, for instance, social transfers 
could immediately improve the familyís food security 
and nutritional status, thus improving labour availability 
and productivity at farm level.
Alleviating liquidity constraints
One of the major barriers to agriculture production is 
lack of access to seasonal liquidity to invest in agriculture 
inputs (Von Pischke et al. 1983; Kydd and Dorward, 2001; 
Ravallion, 2003). The 2008 World Development Report 
on agriculture argues that the costs of financial 
constraints for smallholders are huge, in terms of both 
forgone opportunities and exposure to risk (World Bank, 
2007). The report provides evidence from Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Peru, where 40% of all agricultural 
producers are credit constrained. In Africa, the demise 
of single channel marketing boards, as a result of struc‑
tural adjustment policies, has left a gap in the provision 
of agricultural finance (Winter‑Nelson and Temu, 2005). 
Producers who lack credit are only able to purchase a 
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fraction of inputs compared to their unconstrained 
counterparts. This translates into lower net incomes and 
lower returns to labour and capital (World Bank, 
2007).
Evidence from recent conditional and unconditional 
cash transfer programmes reveals that they not only 
prevent damaging coping strategies (e.g. asset sales, 
indebtedness, removing children from school) but can 
also relax liquidity constraints for smallholder farmers 
and allow them to accumulate productive assets (Coady, 
2004). Evidence on the use of cash transfers to purchase 
agricultural inputs comes from non‑emergency contexts 
as well as emergency situations (Harvey, 2007). Martinez 
(2004) argues that cash transfers can unleash untapped 
productive and income generating potential, by 
boosting household investments in farming as well as 
non‑farm micro‑enterprises. In Lesotho, Old Age Pension 
recipients also use some of their cash transfers as capital 
for income generating activities, such as rearing chickens 
and petty trading activities (Devereux et al, 2005). 
Participants in a pilot cash transfer programme in 
Kalomo District, Zambia have invested almost 30% of 
the cash received on purchasing seed for planting and 
goats for breeding (GTZ, 2005). It is important to put 
these synergistic impacts into context, however. Small 
proportions of small transfers received by some poor 
households may be invested in fertilizer and seeds, but 
this in no way substitutes for the function played by the 
old marketing boards, in terms of large‑scale provision 
of access to (often subsidised) inputs.
The most rigorous evidence on investment uses of 
social transfers comes from large conditional cash 
transfer programmes in Latin America. Following imple‑
mentation of the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the Mexican government implemented 
Procampo in 1994, providing 15 years of support to 
farmers to compensate them for potential losses during 
the period of transition to the free market. The level of 
transfers varies across the programmeís 3 million recipi‑
ents, depending on total hectarage under key crops. 
Sadoulet et al. (2001) finds that Procampo generated a 
multiplier effect in the range of 1.5 to 2.6 pesos, being 
higher for farmers with larger landholdings. Farmers 
used the transfers to purchase agriculture inputs which 
allowed them to overcome a lack of access to credit. A 
recent analysis by Winters and Davis (2007) finds that 
the this impact is also strongly influenced by access to 
irrigation and technical assistance. 
Another cash transfer programme in Mexico, 
Oportunidades (formerly Progresa), provides seasonal 
transfers to poor households conditional on health 
check‑ups and school attendance for children. Gertler 
et al. (2005) finds that in addition to spending the cash 
on direct consumption, Progresa participants invested 
part of the transfer income on investment in land and 
livestock, and were more likely to acquire or upgrade 
these key productive assets than control populations. 
Progresa participants also invested cash transfers in 
other income
generating activities. These increased investments 
resulted in a 24% increase in consumption after six years, 
even following the termination of the programme 
(Gertler et al. 2005). Winters and Davis (2007) find similar 
results for Oportunidades. Both small and large farms 
increased their ownership of draft and production 
animals, while larger farms increased the number of 
hectares under cultivation. 
Taken together the analysis shows that 
Oportunidades appears to have had a substantial 
influence on investment in the productive activities 
of beneficiaries. They entered in animal production, 
invested in draft animals, initiated land use, and 
expanded the number of agricultural products 
produced and consumed, but only moderately 
appear to intensify productionî (Winters and Davis, 
2007: 22). 
Some intriguing contradictory evidence comes from 
a recent evaluation of Nicaraguaís Red de Proteccion 
Social, which found limited evidence of investment of 
transfers in productive activities, including agriculture, 
even though agriculture plays a much larger role in rural 
livelihoods in Nicaragua than in it does in Mexico 
(Maluccio, 2007). The explanation seems to lie in a combi‑
nation of several factors: the transfer level in Nicaragua 
was lower and the recipients were poorer, while there 
was a strong emphasis in the Nicaragua programme on 
using transfers to boost household food consumption. 
The conclusion seems to be that programme design 
and implementation matters in terms of the investment 
impact of cash transfer programs; just because a transfer 
is in cash does not necessarily mean it will get invested 
(Carletto, Davis and Winters, 2008). 
An important general question, raised by this review 
of experiences, is whether the investment use of cash 
transfers is merely a fortuitous secondary effect of 
programmes that aim primarily to boost access to food 
in poor families, or whether these synergies should be 
actively encouraged in programme design and imple‑
mentation. Interestingly, many cash transfer programmes 
in Latin America are increasingly recognising and explic‑
itly promoting these linkages. In Ecuador, a conditional 
cash transfer program called Bono de Desarrollo Humano 
has been linked with a new programme called Credito 
de Desarrollo Humano, whereby the cash transfer serves 
as collateral for the credit. In Paraguay, each family 
receiving conditional cash transfers from the Tekoporã 
programme is assisted by a ëguideí who discusses, 
among other things, household livelihood strategies, 
including production strategies. In Brazil, Bolsa Familia 
is working with the $4 billion PRONAF programme 
(credit to family farmers), whereby the programmes 
become linked for the poorest small farmer families 
(Davis, 2007).
Multiplier effects through locally sourced 
produce
While cash transfers can have direct positive impacts 
on agricultural production due to investment in inputs, 
food transfers can impact on agriculture either positively 
or negatively, in terms of food prices, production incen‑
tives, and spill‑over effects on non‑recipients. A key issue 
is whether food distributed is sourced locally (which is 
likely to create positive ripple effects throughout the 
local economy) or imported (which could impact nega‑
tively on agricultural production and trade). The belief 
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that food aid causes disincentive effects on agriculture 
has been challenged by Barrett (2006), who cautions that 
there is little empirical evidence for this. A study by 
Abdulai et al. (2004) finds that while simple test statistics 
or regressions suggest that disincentive effects of food 
aid on household behaviour can be large and statistically 
significant, these adverse effects disappear when house‑
hold characteristics are taken into account. This study 
also concludes that food aid increases labour supply to 
agriculture, wage work and business activities.
Barrett (2006) notes that food aid imports can cause 
harmful market effects for farmers, due to falling prices 
and commercial displacement. On the other hand, 
non‑food aid recipients who are net food purchasers can 
be harmed if food aid is procured locally, driving food 
prices up. Coulter et al. (2007) finds that in the case of 
Ethiopia and Uganda, local procurement of food aid has 
led to larger price instability than tied food aid. In Ethiopia, 
though, locally procured food aid has also led to the 
development of export markets and food processing 
enterprises. Barrett and Maxwell (2005) conclude that 
well‑targeted and well‑timed food aid has minimal nega‑
tive price effects, because it reaches households who 
are already priced out of the market. However, since food 
aid can affect local production, labour markets and 
consumption patterns they recommend that food aid is 
locally sourced whenever possible. Local sourcing should 
also attempt to develop the overall grain market as 
opposed to developing exclusive relationships with 
specific producer organizations (Coulter et al. 2007). If 
local sourcing is not possible or is unaffordable, attempts 
should be made to source locally preferred food from 
elsewhere within the region instead. 
School feeding schemes or food‑for‑education (FFE) 
have similar impacts on agriculture as food aid. Local 
purchases of food for school meals can stimulate produc‑
tion by augmenting demand, not only for staple crops 
but also for vegetables, meat, eggs and dairy products. 
Ahmed and Sharma (2004) argue that this impact can 
be maximised through the simultaneous provisioning 
of both school feeding and take home rations. One 
success story comes from Guatemala, where the sourcing 
of food for school feeding has shifted from industrial 
suppliers to local producers. Parents of school children 
supply the food and participate in the preparation of 
school meals, thereby earning additional income. In 
Bangladesh, biscuits provided on the school feeding 
programme offer a new market opportunity for local 
wheat farmers (Caldes and Ahmed, 2004). During 
Indonesiaís economic crisis in the 1990s, the government 
initiated a country‑wide school feeding scheme, which 
stipulated that the local staple should not be included 
in school meals, to avoid meal substitution at home, and 
that only locally grown commodities should be used. 
Meals were prepared by local women, organised through 
local womenís associations. A survey found that 72% of 
farmers interviewed said that the school feeding scheme 
had given them more opportunities to sell produce from 
their fields and vegetable gardens (Studert et al. 2004).
An important but unresolved question is whether local 
sourcing is more or less expensive than shipping freely 
donated food aid. Local purchases could significantly 
raise rather than reduce operating costs for humanitarian 
interventions, school feeding and other foodbased 
transfer programmes. Calculations of relative cost‑effec‑
tiveness will depend upon local circumstances (eg 
whether there is a national food surplus or deficit), trans‑
port costs, import/export parity prices, how local 
purchases are managed (eg if private sector actors are 
involved), and whether the second round benefits are 
factored in (eg whether agricultural production and rural 
incomes are stimulated by this increased demand for 
local produce). WFPís new ëpurchase for progressí (P4P) 
initiative should generate clearer answers on these 
questions.
Just as food for social protection programmes can be 
sourced locally, so can agricultural inputs. Critics of input 
distribution programmes argue that they misdiagnose 
the inaccessibility of inputs as unavailability, noting that 
farmers are usually able to source seeds even after severe 
droughts. While free input distribution has recently been 
popular among donors and has effectively boosted agri‑
cultural production and household food security in the 
short term, critics argue that these interventions under‑
mine local seed markets and are inappropriate to local 
farming systems, since tenders tend to be awarded to 
commercial seed and fertiliser companies which do not 
adequately consider the local context and often source 
their seeds from neighbouring countries (Barahona and 
Cromwell, 2005). As an alternative to free seed distribu‑
tion, Orindi and Ochieng (2005) argue that seed voucher 
and fair schemes strengthen local economies through 
the sale of local seeds, are substantially more cost‑effec‑
tive and provide opportunities for information sharing 
among farmers. One project in Kenya distributed 
vouchers to 35,000 farmers, entitling them to buy seeds 
at locally organised seed fairs where farmers and local 
traders were encouraged to sell seeds.
Multiplier effects through cash transfers
While local sourcing of food can generate demand for 
local production, cash transfers are likely to have more 
positive secondary and multiplier effects than food aid, 
because cash is spent on purchasing goods and services 
which in turn creates employment and income for the 
providers of these goods and services. These multipliers 
apply equally to transfers given to economically inactive 
groups (eg social pensions or child support grants) as to 
transfers given to small farmers, though the synergies 
with agriculture are likely to be higher if the recipients 
are farmers, who will spend some of this incremental 
income on farming. The magnitude and distributional 
impacts of economic multipliers depend on a number 
of factors, including the openness and structure of the 
local economy, its linkages with urban centres and other 
large markets (Taylor and Yunez‑Naude, 2002), as well 
as the expenditure patterns of different groups receiving 
cash transfers (in terms of their expenditures on tradable 
and non tradable goods and services). Although the 
macro‑economic benefits claimed for cash transfers are 
based on limited empirical findings, and the evidence 
to date is ambivalent (Devereux and Coll‑Black, 2007), 
there is sound evidence from Africa and Latin America 
for localised multiplier effects of social transfers.
Barrientos and Sabates‑Wheeler (2006) find that the 
benefits of Progresa/Oportunidades spilled over to 
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non‑eligible households, resulting in positive consump‑
tion effects in both included and ineligible households 
in programme areas. Moreover, ineligible households in 
programme areas had higher probabilities of livestock 
and land ownership than ineligible households in areas 
where Progresa was absent. Another study, of a cash 
transfer programme in Malawi, found a significant 
regional multiplier effect, estimated at 2.11 (Davies, 
2007). Local commerce and village traders were signifi‑
cant winners, with many cash transfer recipients 
purchasing goods from these groups. Smallholder 
farmers gained more than larger farmers from the 
programme, because they were able to supply traders 
to meet the increased demand.
In Ethiopia, local traders indicated that they were indi‑
rect beneficiaries of the Productive Safety Net Programme, 
as cash transfers stimulated demand for their goods 
(Devereux et al. 2006b). One maize trader indicated that 
PSNP beneficiaries represented 10‑15% of his clientele. 
Gebre‑Selassie and Beshah (2003) also documented 
increased numbers of buyers and sellers of basic 
commodities in an Ethiopian cash‑for‑work programme. 
However, there is some concern about the potential 
negative impacts of cash transfers on local markets. 
Though traders are generally supportive of the PSNP, 
they acknowledged that it has had an inflationary effect 
on essential commodities (Guenther, 2007). This outcome 
is predictable, given the weakness of markets in rural 
Ethiopia, but might be only a transitional problem as 
traders adjust volumes in response to the purchasing 
power of PSNP participants.
Timing and seasonality
Although the detrimental effects of seasonality on small‑
holder poverty and vulnerability are well known 
(Chambers et al. 1981; Dercon and Krishnan, 2000), the 
implications of seasonality are inadequately reflected in 
agricultural development policies. Seasonal variability 
of grain prices in uni‑modal rainfall systems where 
markets are weak results in skewed access to locally 
produced food, with implications for hunger and malnu‑
trition. Grain prices are typically lowest post‑harvest 
when demand is lowest and begin to rise during the 
rainy season, peaking just before the next harvest, 
resulting in reduced food consumption (Devereux, 2007). 
Restricted access to food and increased malnutrition 
during the rainy season also correlate with increased 
vulnerability to diseases such as malaria (Chambers et 
al. 1981). Seasonal variability in rural well‑being implies 
that interventions designed to support production and 
consumption must also be carefully timed, to address 
specific problems at the optimal time (eg ensuring that 
farm inputs are available at planting time, and that access 
to food is enhanced during the ‘lean season’) and to 
minimise the risk of conflicts (eg not implementing public 
works during peak times for on‑farm labour needs). 
Household vulnerability to seasonal variations in agri‑
cultural production, food and asset prices, labour demand 
and health status require timely and appropriate social 
protection interventions to mitigate such stresses. In 
regards to agricultural production seasonality, Devereux 
(2007) highlights the importance of facilitating access 
to inputs for smallholders who face seasonal cash 
constraints. While fertiliser subsidies or free inputs distri‑
bution are controversial due to their adverse market and 
distributional effects (World Bank, 2007), they have 
successfully boosted foodcrop production, notably in 
Malawi which has implemented the universal ‘Starter 
Pack’ programme, the ‘Targeted Input Programme’ and 
targeted input subsidies since the mid‑1990s, with posi‑
tive impacts on food production and household and 
national food security (Levy, 2005). 
With respect to commodity price seasonality, fluctua‑
tions in food and asset prices undermine household food 
security by raising the cost of accessing food while 
reducing the market value of assets sold at ëdistress 
pricesí to buy food. Uncertainty in commodity markets 
makes it difficult for farmers to allocate productive 
resources efficiently, and may cause producers, consumers 
and traders to engage in risk‑reducing strategies such 
as diversification into lower value but more stable prod‑
ucts, not using purchased inputs, and not trading in 
remote locations (World Bank, 2005). Prior to structural 
adjustment, African governments typically intervened 
in grain markets in an attempt to ensure price stability 
throughout the year for both consumers and producers, 
through parastatals such as the Food Distribution 
Corporation in Ghana and mechanisms such as the 
Strategic Grain Reserve in Malawi (Devereux, 2007). 
Institutions such as the World Bank continue to advocate 
against ëinterventionistí measures in favour of market‑
based solutions (World Bank 2005; 2007). Nonetheless, 
large countries like China, India and Brazil still intervene 
in grain markets to ensure price stabilisation for the 
benefit of small farmers. In Africa, there are alternatives 
to parastatal interventions that arguably should be 
explored and supported, such as community‑managed 
grain banks (which are common in West Africa) or activi‑
ties undertaken by farmersí organisations.
While market‑based tools such as futures markets are 
able to insulate producers from shortterm price volatility, 
they are typically not accessible in low‑income countries. 
Commodity exchanges and futures markets have been 
established in China, India, South Africa and Thailand 
but the establishment of such instruments are dependent 
on good financial and legal institutions (World Bank, 
2007). The World Bank argues that governments should 
facilitate the private sectorís adoption of measures such 
as warehouse receipts and the purchasing of futures and 
option; however, such market instruments are them‑
selves dependent on integrated markets and may not 
be accessible to small‑scale producers. 
Seasonal price volatility also has implications for the 
design of social protection programmes, particularly cash 
transfers. In contexts where food prices are rising, either 
seasonally or during food crises, the purchasing power 
of a fixed cash transfer can quickly be eroded, under‑
mining household access to food. Two recent interven‑
tions in Malawi responded innovatively to this challenge. 
The ëFood and Cash Transferí (FACT) and ëDowa 
Emergency Cash Transferí (DECT) projects delivered cash 
transfers to drought‑affected smallholders that were 
adjusted every month in line with changes in the local 
prices of food staples. By ensuring that households main‑
tained access to a constant quantity of food, even when 
prices doubled, both projects succeeded in smoothing 
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consumption during the food crisis as well as protecting 
households from damaging coping strategies (Devereux 
et al. 2006a). Another cash transfer programme imple‑
mented in Malawi and Zambia at the same time was less 
effective in smoothing household consumption, because 
the transfers were not adjusted for price inflation so their 
value in food terms fell steadily from month to month 
(Harvey and Savage, 2006).
In terms of labour market seasonality, well‑timed 
public works projects can partly address the seasonal 
under‑employment that is typical of rain‑fed agriculture 
systems. As an ‘employment‑based safety net’, food‑ or 
cash‑for work offers smallholders a supplementary 
source of food or income for consumption smoothing 
purposes when they fail to achieve production self‑suf‑
ficiency. The best known employment‑based safety net 
is Maharashtra’s Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS), 
which was recently expanded to all of rural India, under 
the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 2005. 
The Act entitles every rural household to 100 days of 
employment at the local average agricultural wage. Apart 
from smoothing consumption in farming households 
during hungry seasons or bad years, the assets constructed 
by the public works activities are intended to boost agri‑
cultural production by enhancing market access and soil 
fertility. One risk with public works is that participation
may force smallholders to divert their labour away 
from vital own‑farm activities such as weeding, especially 
if employment is offered during periods of high agricul‑
tural activity – which is also the ‘hungry season’. This 
creates a trade‑off between social protection for imme‑
diate consumption needs and longer‑term returns to 
agriculture (McCord, 2005).
Thresholds and scale effects
Vulnerability in smallholder households often arises from 
the existence of various ‘thresholds’ in rural livelihoods. 
Thresholds imply non‑linear effects, such that livelihoods 
are particularly sensitive or vulnerable to changes over 
particular ranges of certain variables. Three ëthresholdsí 
illuminate possible synergies and conflicts between 
agricultural and social protection policies. Asset thresh‑
olds (Carter and Barrett, 2007) arise where certain combi‑
nations or numbers of assets are needed to engage in 
certain livelihood activities (eg 2 oxen are needed for 
ploughing), or to support particular levels of welfare. 
Households without these minimum assets face ëpoverty 
trapsí. Price thresholds occur either where certain activi‑
ties become worthwhile (or unprofitable) above (or 
below) a particular price, or across import (or export) 
parity such that prices become highly variable above (or 
below) the parity price but are relatively constant below 
(or above) parity price. Market thresholds describe situ‑
ations where increasing market players and volumes lead 
to falling transaction risks (of commitment failure and 
opportunism) and falling transaction costs, resulting in 
thresholds below (above) which investment is not (is) 
profitable, leading to low level, under‑investment traps: 
a vicious circle involving low levels of economic activity 
with few market players and low market volumes, high 
transport and communication costs, high transaction 
risks and costs, weak contractual enforcement institu‑
tions, high physical and market risks, and supply chain 
investment disincentives and failures (Dorward et al. 
2005; Dorward and Kydd, 2005). All of these constraints 
on rural livelihoods reinforce the argument made earlier 
in this paper, that there is a logical convergence between 
agricultural policy and social protection policy ñ inter‑
ventions in assets, prices or markets could benefit both 
agricultural production and household food security.
A further source of rural vulnerability, which is also 
associated with price and market thresholds, results from 
multipliers (or externalities) and scale effects. When large 
numbers of people act in similar ways, this affects the 
environments in which they operate. This is true for 
example of the natural environment, where large 
numbers of people harvesting natural resources may 
lead to their degradation, and it is true of markets, where 
large numbers of people buying (or selling) products or 
services may lead to price rises (or falls). 
Concern with moving poor and vulnerable people 
across asset thresholds has recently received much atten‑
tion within the social protection literature and in several 
social protection programmes. Asset transfers are a 
feature of two large scale programmes in Bangladesh: 
ëChallenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction: 
Targeting the Ultra Poorí (CFPR/TUP), and the ëChars 
Livelihood Programmeí. The thinking is that productive 
assets can generate future streams of income, so asset 
transfers to asset‑poor households could reduce poverty 
more sustainably than food or cash transfers. BRAC’s 
‘Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction’ 
programme recognises the limitations of market‑based 
mechanisms, such as micro‑credit, in reaching the chronic 
poor, and instead offers assets (livestock, leased land, 
tools, seeds) to rural women for use in income‑generating 
activities, including agriculture (vegetable gardening or 
nursery cultivation). The programme also provides a 
ësubsistence allowanceí for 18 months and access to 
health and legal services. The cash transfer was intended 
to cover part of the householdís subsistence food needs 
until the asset transfer started to generate regular streams 
of income. The project completion report concluded that 
the asset transfers had resulted in rapid and significant 
improvements in the livelihoods of extremely poor 
households, who now enjoyed more diversified and 
stable incomes (DFID Bangladesh, 2006). The ëChars 
Livelihood Programmeí includes a cash transfer to chroni‑
cally poor farmers for the purchase of productive assets. 
A recent study reveals that cattle purchases have gener‑
ated a 30% return, contributing to income diversification 
(Marks, 2007). The ëReducing Vulnerability to Climate 
Changeí (RVCC) project also transferred assets to vulner‑
able Bangladeshi farmers, encouraging the uptake of 
livelihood activities such as rearing ducks to enhance 
income and build resilience in the face of climate change 
(Mallik, 2005).
These examples appear to demonstrate that asset 
accumulation through targeted asset transfer 
programmes can enhance the productive capacity of 
farmers who are otherwise constrained from engaging 
in market‑based initiatives. Indeed, the popularity of 
asset transfers seems to be rising, perhaps because they 
are seen as providing more ëproductiveí support than 
ëwelfaristí transfers. But some concerns have also been 
raised. One question is whether giving assets to poor 
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people is more effective than transferring the cash 
equivalent and allowing recipients to make their own 
spending choices. A second concern is that transferring 
large numbers of (the same) assets risks ëfloodingí local 
economies, which could undermine local markets for 
these assets and/or their products. (An example from 
Ethiopia is provided later in this paper, where so many 
households were given the same ëlivelihood packageí 
that local demand was saturated and prices collapsed.)
An obvious solution is to provide a more diverse menu 
of assets or packages to choose from, but governments 
or donors may have limited options, and extension offi‑
cers might not be trained to deliver advice on a wide 
array of livelihood activities. A related ëlesson learnedí 
is that asset transfers need to be accompanied by 
adequate capacity building. In ëfarmer field schoolí proj‑
ects, for example, each group of 20ñ25 farmers receives 
an initial grant of $400ñ500 to implement activities that 
correspond to their own identified priorities. As their 
capacity builds and the money grows, the group uses 
this fund in subsequent years to diversify into other 
production, processing or marketing opportunities. This 
is a gradual and cumulative ñ but potentially highly effec‑
tive ñ process of organisational capacity building and 
empowerment (van den Berg and Jiggins, 2007).
In Africa, asset transfers have been dominated by live‑
stock re‑stocking after droughts, mainly in pastoralist 
areas, although the Small Livestock Project in Zimbabwe, 
under which DFID‑funded NGOs transfers goats, sheep, 
pigs or poultry to vulnerable rural households (especially 
those affected by HIV and AIDS) has shown that this can 
be implemented as a non‑emergency social protection 
measure (Dzingirai, 2007). On the other hand, the PSNP 
in Ethiopia is innovative in that it combines cash or food 
transfers over an extended period of time with ëliveli‑
hood packagesí that include assets needed to generate 
sustainable and resilient livelihoods for vulnerable house‑
holds. Other programmes such as LEAP in Ghana are 
grounded on similar principles.
The recent focus on household asset thresholds has 
deflected attention away from the critical complemen‑
tarities (and possible conflicts) between household‑level 
productivity improvements and market effects, including 
price thresholds. Development coordination (Dorward 
and Kydd, 2004) requires that threshold effects are not 
analysed in isolation from each other. Consider a ëliveli‑
hood packageí targeted at poor farmers. This package 
may bring them above a specified asset threshold, but 
local markets may be so thin and imperfect that any 
productivity gains are not translated into higher incomes 
because of adverse scale effects (i.e. prices collapse 
because the market is flooded). A related point is the 
scale of the programme ñ the size of the livelihood 
package and of the target group. Even if local markets 
function well and are able to absorb increases in produc‑
tion, if the livelihood package does not bring enough 
households above a critical threshold there will be negli‑
gible multiplier effects and farmers may be unable to 
take advantage of potential economies of scale.
Dorward and Kydd (2005) provide evidence of trade‑
offs between asset and market thresholds in their exami‑
nation of the potential for targeted or universal input 
transfers to support longer‑term pro‑poor growth in 
Malawi. Evaluations of the universal Starter Pack concur 
that it increased maize yields and harvests (Levy, 2005) 
and produced real income gains for poor smallholders. 
The size of these gains depends on changes in food prices 
and wages ñ higher maize production tends to lower 
maize prices and tends to raise rural wages ñ which are 
determined partly by the incremental production attrib‑
uted to the Starter Packs. Dorward (2006) concludes that 
a targeted input transfer would lead to lower benefits 
for poor smallholders than a universal input transfer, since 
limited coverage would restrict the changes in rural 
wages and maize prices. Unfortunately, in both cases ñ 
universal and targeted input transfers ñ the relatively 
small real income gains do not provide enough of a 
stimulus to drive forward a process of growth. Even worse, 
by depressing maize prices, input transfers might under‑
mine incentives for other smallholders to produce maize 
for the market. Paradoxically, therefore, input transfers 
ìmay undermine the important growth contributions of 
less poor households that engage in more intensive 
labour‑demanding maize productionî (Dorward, 2006: 
274). In other words, scale effects matter not only in terms 
of market effects, but incentives might be different 
between the poorest and less poor households, with 
ambiguous implications for economic growth and 
poverty reduction.
Policy complementarities and sequencing
Dorward and Kydd (2005) argue that input, output and 
financial markets are very thin for goods and services in 
many smallholder areas in Malawi, due to the lack of a 
well‑developed and diversified monetary economy, the 
crisis in commercial agriculture, limited migrant labour 
opportunities and alternative avenues for diversification, 
weak services and communications infrastructure, and 
low levels of education, literacy and farmersí organisa‑
tion. Moreover, trading costs are high, information 
services are costly and there is a high risk of transaction 
failures for buyers and sellers. To cover these imperfec‑
tions and risks, prices are high which depresses demand. 
The effect of these conditions as well as the risks associ‑
ated with variable prices and yields (particularly of maize) 
is to trap different players in the supply chains into low‑
level equilibrium activities and perpetuate widespread 
market failure. ìSpecific supply chains needed for rural 
people to intensify farm production or to start adequately 
capitalized non‑farm enterprises tend to be absent or 
very weakî (Dorward and Kydd, 2005: 262).
Dorward et al. (2006) note that where markets are thin 
in poor rural economies, marketbased approaches to 
food security will not work ñ as demonstrated by Malawiís 
2001/02 food crisis. In such contexts, they argue for a 
sequenced approach to food security and rural poverty 
reduction:
ensuring immediate food security requires policies  •
that will work in the absence of effective markets, 
implying a dominant role for social safety nets (where 
the choice between cash and food transfers must be 
based on sound market analysis) and less focus on 
economic growth;
 in the medium‑term there is a need to develop effec‑ •
tive markets and rural infrastructure, while maintaining 
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social protection measures that are sensitive to local 
market conditions;
in the longer term, once markets and traders are well  •
established and rural infrastructure is in place, then 
market‑based policies can be increasingly relied upon 
to promote food security and rural economic 
growth.
The crucial point is that sets of policies must be 
selected that complement each other in achieving short‑ 
and long‑term objectives, and they should be adjusted 
over time as circumstances change. In other words, policy 
synergies between welfare improvements and pro‑poor 
agricultural growth must be exploited sensitively 
depending on prevailing conditions and evolving priori‑
ties at the time. Furthermore, policy instruments need 
to complement each other at different stages of market 
development. Sometimes instruments will need to be 
largely non‑market based, but at other times the appro‑
priate instruments should be predominantly market 
based (see Table 1).
Predictability and risk-taking
Nowhere are the synergies between social protection 
and agricultural policies more powerful than in the area 
of risk reduction. Social protection ñ specifically social 
insurance ñ plays a major role in reducing livelihood risk, 
which is a fundamental cause of rural poverty and vulner‑
ability. Social protection interventions in the agriculture 
sector must recognize that uninsured exposure to risk 
traps smallholders in low‑risk, low productivity farming. 
Dercon (2002) argues that asset and income levels deter‑
mine risk preferences, with the poor adopting low‑risk 
activities whereas the wealthy can afford to adopt riskier 
portfolios of activities and assets that generate higher 
returns. It follows that predictable and regular social 
protection mechanisms (e.g. cash transfers, seasonal 
public works, insurance schemes) can influence produc‑
tivity by stimulating risk‑taking behaviour (Holzmann 
and Jorgensen, 1999; Devereux, 2002a). Gertler et al. 
(2005) argue that if transfers are predictable and are 
perceived as a secure source of income, risk‑averse house‑
holds will be more willing to increase investment in 
productive activities, even in the presence of risk, because 
predictable cash transfers provide a form of ‘safety net’ 
insurance against future shocks.
The ‘Employment Guarantee Scheme’ provides 
low‑waged unskilled manual labour for anyone in rural 
Maharashtra state (India) who requests it. The guarantee 
of paid work serves an insurance function, releasing 
scarce resources that were previously used as precau‑
tionary savings to more productive purposes. Farmers 
in Maharashtra plant higher‑yielding (rather than 
drought‑tolerant) crop varieties than farmers in neigh‑
bouring states (Ravallion, 2003). However, Dorward et 
al. (2006) caution that there is still little understanding 
concerning the magnitude of such insurance effects on 
risk‑taking behaviour. Evidence from Mexico indicates 
that cash transfers on the Procampo programme were 
not sufficient to induce changes in cropping patterns 
among smallholder participants. Devereux (2002b) 
argues that most social protection measures do not 
induce risk‑taking behavioural change, because they are 
neither ‘guaranteed’ nor predictable. This also under‑
mines the sustainability of productive impacts achieved 
through social protection, which could be greatly 
enhanced through relatively minor changes in design 
and implementation. 
Insurance mechanisms also have the positive effects 
of ensuring predictability and encouraging risk‑taking. 
Most smallholders do not have access to crop insurance, 
which means that livelihood shocks (eg weather‑induced 
harvest failure) lead inevitably to loss of productive 
Table 1. Policy requirements for short and long term achievements of food security, poverty 
reduction and rural economic growth
Policy Goals Requirements for Short/ 
Medium Term Achievement 
(Policy purpose)
Requirements for Medium/ Long Term 
Achievement (Policy purpose)
Food security: Secure and 
affordable access to food
Increased food production 
self‑sufficiency (especially 
for small farmers) with food 
delivery and/or productivity 
enhancing safety nets and 
humanitarian response
Increased household and national food market 
access (low and stable cost, secure, timely) 
through wider entitlements with (mainly) 
market‑based safety nets and humanitarian 
response
Poverty reduction: Real 
incomes of the poor 
increase and are more 
secure, through low food 
costs, higher returns to 
labour, and safety nets
Productive safety nets for 
poor farmers (such as input 
subsidies) to increase/ 
secure real incomes and 
develop/ protect assets
Increased agricultural production and diversified 
rural livelihoods; broadbased economic growth 
with opportunities and wages for unskilled rural 
labour, low food prices, and safety net and 
humanitarian response as above
Rural economic growth: 
Increased levels of local 
economic activity, with 
stable income opportuni‑
ties supporting poverty 
reduction and food security
Achievement in the short‑/ 
medium‑term is not 
possible
Macro‑economic stability and low interest rates; 
growth in agricultural and non‑agricultural 
sectors tightening labour markets and raising 
real incomes with stable/affordable food prices. 
Development of market economy. Initial growth 
must be achieved without depending on 
(nonexistent) markets or firms.
Source: Modified from Dorward and Kydd (2003)
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assets, which could be prevented if accessible insurance 
markets or social insurance mechanisms were in place. 
Crop insurance for smallholders has failed for a number 
of reasons: high transaction costs, moral hazard, adverse 
selection, covariate risk and delayed payouts (Alderman 
and Haque, 2007; Hellmuth et al. 2007; Hess and Syroka, 
2005), all of which make private crop insurance economi‑
cally unviable for insurers and inaccessible or unrespon‑
sive to client needs (IISD, 2006). 
Recently, there has been a move away from insuring 
against poor crop yields on individual farms toward 
insuring against bad weather in the locality. A ëweather 
indexedí approach writes the insurance contract not 
against harvest failure but against a local index ñ say, 
rainfall shortage or days of frost ñ that is correlated with 
harvest outcomes. Farmers collect insurance compensa‑
tion if the index reaches a ëtriggerí level, regardless of 
actual crop losses. Since variables like rainfall and temper‑
ature are exogenous to policy‑holders, problems such 
as moral hazard and adverse selection are avoided. Index‑
based insurance products reduce transaction costs by 
eliminating the need for individual farm level adjust‑
ments, so they can also provide more timely payouts. 
Indexed‑based weather insurance can play both a protec‑
tive and productive function. Because payments are 
disbursed rapidly, farmers are able to smooth their 
consumption following a poor harvest, while avoiding 
costly coping strategies such as selling productive assets. 
Since insured households and farms are more credit‑
worthy, investment in productive assets and high‑
er‑yielding crops is also promoted (Mechler et al. 2006). 
Pilot weather‑indexed insurance schemes are now 
underway in Argentina, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Ethiopia, 
Malawi, Morocco, India and Ukraine. The main constraint 
is their cost – on a commercial basis, premiums are too 
high for smallholders and typically need to be subsidised 
by governments or development agencies.
Targeting and gender issues
There is an ongoing debate about whether social protec‑
tion interventions that target the ëpoorest of the poorí 
should be expected to generate productive impacts on 
agriculture and the wider rural economy, or conversely, 
whether social protection that aims to impact positively 
on agriculture should be targeted at the poorest, or at 
the slightly less poor. Cash transfer projects that target 
the poorest 10% in rural communities (eg in Kalomo 
District, Zambia and Mchinji District, Malawi) report only 
marginal and indirect effects on agriculture, because 
people in this decile rarely engage in agricultural produc‑
tion ñ they have either no land or too little labour (being 
orphaned, elderly or disabled). Because they are (i) easily 
identifiable as extremely poor, and (ii) dependent on 
others for support, targeting this group is usually uncon‑
troversial or even popular, since it alleviates a heavy 
burden of care from the community. Cash transfers tend 
to be mainly consumed by this group, and there is little 
evidence of investment in agriculture. Any cash that can 
be saved is more likely to be used to buy a chicken or a 
goat than fertiliser or seed.
Cash transfers targeted at the poorest might have an 
indirect impact on agriculture, if it increases demand for 
locally produced food. This impact is likely to be negli‑
gible for pilot projects that reach only a few thousand 
households, but bigger programmes, such as Bolsa 
Familia which reaches 25% of the national population, 
might have significant impacts on demand, thereby 
stimulating an equivalent supply response, but these 
effects have not been rigorously evaluated. Holmes et 
al. (2007) argue that social protection programming 
should be designed and targeted according to different 
categories of households and the different sources of 
risk that they face. For instance, destitute people who 
are unable to work or farm will not benefit from public 
works or input subsidies, while smallholders who face 
occasional livelihood shocks could benefit from social 
insurance or private insurance mechanisms such as 
weatherindexed crop insurance or price hedging through 
commodity futures markets (see Figure 1).
On the other hand, public works have been criticised 
for imposing onerous work requirements on poor people, 
and it could be argued that the ‘poor’ and ‘transient poor’ 
groups in Figure 1 should receive (unconditional or condi‑
tional) cash transfers instead, some of which they might 
well invest in agriculture or non‑farm income‑generating 
activities. The case for conditionality (rather than a work 
requirement) is that this links the provision of transfers 
to access to essential services that are beneficial in terms 
of both general well‑being (especially health) and 
enhanced productivity (education and health). So cash 
transfers have productive potential if targeted at 
economically active people (such as small farmers), and 
Figure 1. Targeting social protection interventions by household categories
Source: Adapted from Slater, 2007
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conditionalities that contribute to human capital forma‑
tion could magnify this productive impact, even offering 
a potential pathway out of poverty. 
Social protection programmes have intended and 
unintended gender implications that are often ambig‑
uous. For example, conditional cash transfer programmes, 
which are based on the concept of ëco‑responsibility’, 
have been accused of imposing heavy demands on 
mothers who are more likely than fathers to assume 
responsibility for meeting conditionalities such as 
ensuring that children attend school and clinics 
(Molyneux, 2006, 2007). Apart from reinforcing ëtradi‑
tionalí gender roles, these conditions can displace 
womenís labour from farming or income‑generating 
activities. One evaluation of Oportunidades found that 
the increased workload of women was compounded by 
the fact that their childrenís contribution to domestic 
tasks decreased as a result of school attendance (Adato 
et al. 2000). Similarly, Devereux (1999, 2002b) argues that 
efforts to target women in public works projects by 
setting gender quotas can lead to ëperverse effectsí, if 
women who are already ‘time‑poor’ and over‑burdened 
are obliged to increase their workload to access social 
transfers. In Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme, 
female public works participants complained of difficul‑
ties in managing their domestic and childcare responsi‑
bilities as well as the public works, and were forced to 
work extremely long days (Sharp et al. 2006).
There is less disagreement on the benefits of targeting 
women with transfers rather than men, given the 
evidence from many countries that men have a higher 
propensity to spend incremental income on themselves, 
while women have a higher propensity to allocate incre‑
mental food or cash to their families, especially their 
children (Haddad et al., 1997). Argueo et al. (2006) find 
that the unconditional Child Support Grant in South 
Africa, which is usually given to mothers, leads to signifi‑
cantly greater childrenís height. Similarly, Duflo (2000) 
found that old age pensions in South Africa given to 
grandmothers had disproportionately benefited girls 
under their care. Further, concerns that transferring cash, 
food or assets directly to women could increase domestic 
violence against them have proved to be unfounded. 
On the other hand, if the objective of a programme is to 
raise household productivity and incomes, the case for 
targeting individuals who own and work with productive 
assets is stronger. For instance, if women have no access 
to land and men are responsible for ploughing, a 
programme that transfers draught oxen for ploughing 
to farmers might be more logically targeted at men than 
women, in order to maximise synergies between social 
protection and agricultural productivity.
The political economy of national and 
international relations
All policy choices come with opportunity costs ñ the cost 
of funding one social protection measure (e.g. safety nets) 
limits resources for other interventions in agriculture (e.g. 
irrigation). Many of these trade‑offs are political: deci‑
sions such as the particular instrument chosen, levels of 
funding allocated and whether interventions are targeted 
or universal, will all be influenced by domestic politics 
and global donor priorities, which are not linear processes 
but complex and constantly evolving (Dorward et al. 
2006). The political economy of food security is particu‑
larly complicated, since food security sits at the intersec‑
tion of agricultural development and social protection 
policy. As an example of the politicization and intercon‑
nectedness of agricultural and social protection policies, 
consider the global food aid system, where international 
donors deliver social assistance in the form of food 
produced with heavy subsidies by their own farmers. At 
the same time, food security is a major domestic political 
issue within low‑income countries, where the opportuni‑
ties that food handouts provide for politicised targeting 
are counter‑balanced by fears of dependency, from 
household to national levels. If social protection and 
agricultural policies are manipulated for political 
purposes, domestically or globally, they can become 
regressive rather than progressive, leading to the exclu‑
sion and marginalisation of certain groups, and rein‑
forcing established power hierarchies to the detriment 
of the poor and vulnerable (Cromwell and Chintedza, 
2005).
On the other hand, one positive political trend relates 
to the extension of rights‑based approaches to develop‑
ment, notably the ëvoluntary guidelinesí on the right to 
food, which many governments have now signed (FAO, 
2004). Nonetheless, significant political barriers remain 
to expanding social protection in sub‑Saharan Africa. 
One factor is elite perceptions of poverty and the poor: 
governments are hesitant to implement ‘welfare’ type 
measures which they perceive as creating dependency 
amongst the poor (Ng’ethe et al. 2004; Sabates‑
Wheeler et al. 2007). In Kenya, Ngíethe et al. (2004) 
notes that the social protection agenda is hampered by 
political elites who regard the poor as undeserving. 
Similarly in Zambia, the discourse around social protec‑
tion distinguishes between the ëdeservingí and ëunde‑
servingí poor, with policy being biased towards 
ëvulnerable but viableí households who are not the 
poorest of the poor but instead are clustered close to 
the poverty line (Barrientos et al. 2005).
These attitudes of local elites are coupled with the 
concept of ‘co‑responsibility’ which emerged as a key 
feature of the ‘New Poverty Agenda’ in international 
donor circles. Co‑responsibility or co‑management 
attempts to prevent a ‘dependency culture’ by requiring 
programme beneficiaries to take on some responsibility 
to ëhelp themselvesí (by providing labour on public 
works schemes and social funds, sending their children 
to school or clinic on conditional cash transfer schemes, 
and so on) (Cornwall, 2003). This approach is consistent 
with pressure on donors to demonstrate economic effi‑
ciency and cost‑recovery. The popularity of ëconditional 
cash transfersí in many countries can also be partly 
explained in terms of governments needing to justify 
social protection expenditures to local elites and middle 
classes who believe that such measures simply increase 
dependency on ëhandoutsí (Dorward et al, 2006). 
In the planning stage for Ethiopiaís Productive Safety 
Net Programme (PSNP), some donors, notably USAID 
and the World Bank, argued that cash or food transfers 
should not be conditional only on public works employ‑
ment but that beneficiaries should also be obliged to 
meet certain health and education requirements for their 
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children. These conditionalities were eventually dismissed 
due to inadequate public service provision and govern‑
ment capacity for monitoring. Nonetheless, the govern‑
ment of Ethiopia insisted on participation in public works 
for people able to work, and the government is also 
determined that programme participants will ëgraduateí 
from the PSNP after no longer than five years. Both condi‑
tions are intended to prevent dependency (Sabates‑
Wheeler et al. 2007). Concerns about breeding 
ëdependencyí, coupled with an elite perception of poor 
people as ëundeservingí, explains the reluctance of many 
major donors and national governments to embrace a 
rights‑based approach to social protection.
Conflicts between donors and domestic political 
agendas are also evident in the case of Malawiís fertiliser 
subsidy programme (discussed in more detail below). 
Donors have resisted blanket fertiliser subsidies in Malawi 
since economic liberalisation was imposed in the early 
1990s. On the other hand, DFID supported a targeted 
distribution of free inputs until 2004. During the 2004 
election campaign, all leading candidates promised some 
support to the smallholder sector, with a consensus 
emerging around fertiliser subsidies for maize and 
tobacco producers. After the election, the government 
hesitated to implement a universal subsidy, choosing 
instead to enlarge the targeted input distribution 
programme. This hesitation was due to fears that a 
universal programme could jeopardise Malawiís eligi‑
bility for debt relief, with donors warning that the coun‑
tryís ability to reach the completion point would be 
compromised. The 2004/05 food crisis intensified the 
fertiliser debate, and in June 2005, despite donor resis‑
tance led by IMF and USAID, the president announced 
the introduction of a targeted fertiliser subsidy 
programme, with a budget entirely financed by the 
Malawian government. Following a successful first year 
in 2005/06, donors began to engage more constructively 
in this debate, recognising that the government had a 
democratic mandate for the programme (Chinsinga, 
2007a).
The PSNP in Ethiopia and the fertiliser subsidy 
programme in Malawi both demonstrate that donors 
need to recognise the local political economy of agricul‑
ture policy and adopt a pragmatic approach, especially 
when governments have a mandate to deliver on elec‑
tion promises on an issue as politically sensitive as house‑
hold food security. Agricultural and social protection 
policies and programmes must be designed to allow for 
political realities as well as technocratic factors, which 
also implies that they need to be politically as well as 
financially viable in the long term (Dorward et al. 2006). 
As Ravallion (2003) argues, not only are redistribution 
policies necessary for both growth and equity reasons, 
but they are most efficient if they are sustained over 
time.
Conflicts and synergies with informal 
social protection
Some researchers have suggested that public transfers 
may simply ëcrowd outí private transfers between 
community members (Cox and Jimenez, 1995; Coady, 
2004; Dercon, et al. 2006), and that such ëinformalí social 
protection measures are collapsing under increasing 
stress (Devereux, 2006b; Ellis, 2006). This argument is 
particularly salient for agriculture growth, given that 
informal community‑level mechanisms have been found 
to significantly influence access to assets and household 
resilience in the face of shocks (Mogues, 2006; 
Frankenberger et al. 2007). 
Available evidence from cash transfer programmes 
challenges the ëcrowding outí hypothesis. Tereul and 
Davis (2000) found that cash transfers from Progresa had 
no negative impact on the incidence or level of monetary 
or non‑monetary private transfers between Mexican 
households. Conversely, some evidence suggests that 
cash transfers may facilitate growth or strengthening of 
informal social protection measures. In Zambia, Schubert 
(2004) finds that cash transfers enabled participants to 
engage in local rotating savings clubs, known as 
ëChilimbaí, by forming groups and paying a portion of 
their cash transfers into the fund each month. In Ethiopia, 
the Productive Safety Net Programme has fostered the 
regeneration of a rotating savings scheme known as 
ëikubí. Participants in the PSNP cash‑for‑work programme 
have accumulated sizeable sums in ëikibí, which they 
have used to purchase livestock and agricultural inputs 
(Guenther, 2007). So it seems plausible that cash transfers 
that increase income in poor households may rejuvenate 
informal social protection mechanisms, rather than 
displacing them.
Lessons and ways forward
There has recently been a striking convergence in policy 
debates between agricultural and social protection poli‑
cies, especially in Africa, which can be explained by 
several interconnected factors, including:
the global resurgence of policy interest in poverty and  •
hunger reduction, driven by the MDGs;
the recognition that African poverty remains predomi‑ •
nantly rural, where livelihoods continue to be domi‑
nated by smallholder agriculture;
the neglect of agriculture by national policy‑makers  •
and international donors since the 1980s; and
the emergence of social protection as a more ambi‑ •
tious policy agenda than ësocial safety netsí for miti‑
gating and reducing livelihood risks.
This convergence between ësocialí and ëeconomicí 
policies for poor farmers was anticipated by earlier 
debates in the 1990s around ëlinking relief and devel‑
opmentí and ëproductivityenhancing safety netsí, but 
has been sharpened by the ëcolonisationí by social 
protection of many traditional agricultural policy instru‑
ments, including innovative approaches to crop insur‑
ance, agricultural input subsidies and even grain futures 
markets. The conventional view ñ that agricultural poli‑
cies promote growth in yields and incomes, while social 
protection stabilises yields and consumption (when 
production fails) ñ has been challenged by evidence that 
both objectives can be achieved, over specific popula‑
tions, in a single instrument. The evidence base for these 
positive synergies is growing rapidly.
Our first general conclusion cannot be emphasised 
strongly enough. The appropriate mix of policies and 
instruments needed to achieve both ëlivelihood protec‑
tioní and ëlivelihood promotioní objectives in poor 
smallholder communities differs between countries and 
Table 4: Proportion of rural households severely 
affected by different shocks and stresses, 2005 
to 2007
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regions at different stages of development (i.e. with 
different levels of economic activity, infrastructure and 
market development). This means that lessons from areas 
with different characteristics should be applied with great 
caution to other areas with different conditions ñ there 
are no ëblueprintsí that are easily transferable across 
different countries and contexts. For example, it cannot 
be assumed that market‑based solutions that work well 
in countries which have already experienced some rural 
growth and agricultural transformation will drive growth 
and transformation in countries that are still dominated 
by low input, low output semi‑subsistence agriculture.
To take a specific (and currently popular) social protec‑
tion instrument, conditional cash transfers that link social 
assistance with social services have been very effective 
in parts of Latin America, but cannot be applied in many 
African countries where education and health services 
are much weaker and are often inaccessible to many of 
the poorest and most vulnerable rural families, who need 
social assistance most. Similarly, the effects of uncondi‑
tional cash transfers or different kinds of insurance (and 
the demand for insurance against different kinds of risks) 
change with economic and institutional growth, and 
vary
between different economies and cultures. Current 
preoccupations with promoting ëpolicy transfersí 
between Latin America, South Asia and Africa risk over‑
looking cultural variations and the importance of deriving 
context‑specific solutions. This is a weakness of the World 
Development Report on agriculture (World Bank, 2007) 
ñ it sets out a generic ëstages of growthí typology, but 
assumes that market‑based solutions that work well in 
what Dorward and Kydd (2004) label ‘stage 2‑3’ transitions 
will help other countries make the prior ‘stage 1‑2’ transi‑
tion. This is not necessarily so, especially given the very 
different market contexts in which the poor are engaged 
in  these di f ferent  ëstagesí  of  agr icultura l 
development.
Three further lessons follow from this argument. The 
first is that successful rural development requires complex 
transitions not only in policy objectives but in the nature 
of instruments, notably in a switch from non‑market to 
market‑based instruments. A particular challenge here 
is that in the early stages of agricultural development 
non‑market mechanisms must be deployed in ways that 
‘crowd in’ rather than ‘crowd out’ market development 
– conflicts must be avoided between social protection 
and agricultural objectives. But policy‑makers must also 
be alert to changing circumstances, and should respond 
flexibly by adapting policy mixes that are well adapted 
to these changing circumstances. For instance, food aid 
might be an essential social protection instrument at 
one point in time, but can become a drag on the attain‑
ment of other longer‑term objectives if it becomes insti‑
tutionalised (this might have happened in Ethiopia), and 
should be phased out in favour of other instruments as 
soon as this becomes apparent (Ethiopia is belatedly 
attempting to do this).
The second (apparently contradictory) point is that 
everyone who engages in agriculturebased livelihoods, 
including not just small farmers but traders, transporters 
and rural service providers, desperately need continuity 
and stability in the policies that affect their efforts to 
make a living. Farmers in Ethiopia who are unsure whether 
the government will confiscate and redistribute their 
land (again) at any time are unlikely to invest in produc‑
tivity‑enhancing inputs and equipment (so policy uncer‑
tainty inhibits productivity gains). Traders in Malawi who 
donít know whether fertiliser will be subsidised from 
one season to the next have little incentive to set up 
import contracts or invest in storage capacity (so policy 
uncertainty undermines market development). 
Conversely, all available evidence confirms that regular 
and predictable social transfers (eg social pensions in 
southern Africa) are not only consumed but invested in 
farming, non‑farm enterprises and asset purchases (so 
predictability and continuity drives investment and asset 
accumulation).
This argument for consistency is not inconsistent with 
the argument for adaptability and flexibility. Policy 
should evolve as economies and societies change, but 
policy changes should be clearly and transparently articu‑
lated in terms of the longer‑term vision that government 
is pursuing. ‘The aim should be a policy set which provides 
consistency and complementarity of policies across 
different policy goals and time periods’ (Dorward and 
Kydd, 2004: 263). In the short‑term, policy reversals from 
year to year – especially, in this context, government or 
parastatal interventions in agricultural input and output 
markets – are only confusing and signal indecisiveness 
(or unhelpful donor interference), not flexibility. The third 
argument follows from the previous two, and relates to 
analytical and implementation capacity. The complexity 
of agricultural transitions, the ever‑increasing range of 
available policy instruments and the imperative to 
provide an enabling environment for producers, traders 
and consumers all imply a need for substantial and 
sustained capacity building at national and local levels. 
Policy‑makers, analysts, bureaucrats and operational staff 
all need to acquire the relevant information and analytical 
skills in order to: (1) assess what mix of interventions is 
required at any given time;  (2) select the most appro‑
priate instruments;  (3) design and deliver agricultural 
and social protection programmes effectively; and  (4)
adapt and switch these interventions as circumstances 
change, but without undermining the confidence of 
farmers and market actors.
Finally, we note six lessons for organisations engaged 
in promoting agricultural development and food security 
and maximising synergies between social protection and 
smallholder policies, for which the evidence presented 
in this review is fairly conclusive.
Social protection can promote food security and agri‑ •
cultural production directly, for instance if cash trans‑
fers are invested in agricultural inputs such as fertiliser, 
thereby alleviating the seasonal liquidity constraints 
that poor smallholders everywhere face. On the other 
hand, variations in programme design and implemen‑
tation (eg imposing conditionalities on how transfers 
can be used, or not providing transfers to the holders 
of productive assets) can limit or negate these potential 
synergies.
Food‑based social transfers can promote rather than  •
inhibit agricultural growth, provided that food is 
sourced locally and impacts on production and markets 
are closely monitored. However, local purchase of food 
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might be prohibitively expensive; more analytical work 
is needed on the relative costs and benefits of imported 
versus locally sourced food aid.
Maximising synergies requires that social transfers are  •
guaranteed, predictable and regular so as to perform 
an effective insurance function and encourage 
moderate risktaking by uninsured smallholders in 
high‑risk agro‑ecologies. Conversely, seasonality in 
agriculture requires transfers (such as fertiliser) to be 
carefully timed. This has implications for capacity 
building: Ministry of Agriculture staff need to learn 
about social protection, while social protection experts 
need to learn about the particular complexity of agri‑
culture and the seasonality of rural livelihoods.
Asset transfers and ensuring access to agricultural  •
inputs are essential components of any comprehensive 
plan to assist smallholders cross ëasset thresholdsí and 
escape from ëlow input, low outputí poverty traps. 
However, the specific components of the strategy must 
be context‑specific, based on an understanding of the 
fundamental constraints to productivity gains. 
Malawian agriculture, for instance, clearly needs to 
focus on achieving a major push in productivity, prob‑
ably by assuring access to inputs. In highland Ethiopia 
the natural resource base is so stressed that there might 
be merit in the governmentís view that (sensitively 
facilitated) resettlement to new land is the only viable 
option for ëcrossing the thresholdí.
Agricultural and social protection policies must be  •
acutely sensitive to the fundamental dilemma about 
appropriate food prices: low prices are good for poor 
consumers, but high prices are needed to stimulate 
investment in agriculture and raise smallholder 
incomes. Policy‑makers and analysts need to be trained 
to differentiate between ënormalí price seasonality 
and abnormal price spirals indicative of market failure, 
and interventions need to correct for market failures 
without undermining incentives in the local food 
system.
A number of innovative agricultural policies that are  •
being promoted under the ënew social protection 
agendaí (weather‑indexed insurance, commodities 
exchanges, futures markets), have the potential to 
deliver ‘livelihood protection’ and ‘livelihood promo‑
tion’ in a single instrument. Although significant syner‑
gies between social protection and agricultural policy 
objectives can be achieved through these mecha‑
nisms, familiar problems remain to be resolved ñ the 
need for coordination rather than territoriality between 
different ministries and interest groups; the imperative 
for harmonization rather than contradictions across 
policies; and the pooling of funds rather than diversion 
of resources to favoured projects or special 
programmes. The enormous opportunities for ëwin‑
winí synergies, as demonstrated in this paper, will 
surely generate the necessary incentives to overcome 
these challenges.
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